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The Effects of Political Corruption on Caribbean Development 
by Michael W. Collier 
Latin American and Caribbean Center 
Florida International University 
Miami, Florida 
A paper prepared for the Caribbean Studies Association annual conference to  be held from 
May 27 to June 2,2002, in Nassau, Bahamas. 
Bribery and corruption lead to a society where economic and political decisions become twisted. 
They slow social progress, hamper economic development, and drive up prices for products and 
services. A corrupt society is an unequal and unfair society. 
Shell Oil (quoted in Friends et al. 2002) 
Introduction 
Why have the independent states and territories of the Caribbean not achieved higher levels of 
economic development? To many people in the Caribbean, the answer to this question lies in 
dependency theory (Cardoso & Faletto 1979). Many in the Caribbean see the root of their 
economic development problems in their legacies of imperialism and slavery. In particular they 
see their problems in the world capitalist system the former colonizers and now developed states 
imposed on the developing states. According to dependency theory, which emerges from 
structural Marxism, this world capitalist system fails to pay Caribbean states and territories a fair 
wage for their labor and a fair price for their exported natural resources and agricultural and 
manufactured products. Blame for this continuing dependency structure is placed on the collusion 
of developed state governments, international financial institutions (International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO), etc.), and the developed world's 
multinational corporations. 
Developed states, on the other hand, take a more agency-based neoclassical economic view as 
they attribute the Caribbean's economic development problems more to the region's lack of diverse 
and open economies, government-ownership of inefficient state enterprises, continued restrictive 
tariff barriers, failure to institute free trade measures, and the lack of good governance measures. 
In particular, developed states are now focusing on how political corruption interferes with the 
"hidden hand" of market economies, which they argue leads to a lack of third world development. 
In the Caribbean, the developed states can point to The Bahamas as a perfect example of where a 
diversified, open economy, combined with low corruption levels resulted in high economic growth. 
With a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of $1 5,258, The Bahamas is the only independent 
Caribbean state listed as a high income developed state by the United Nations (UNDP 2001). 
Caribbean citizens tend to overlook political corruption, the misuse of public power for private 
benefit, as a factor that retards the region's slow economic development. One reason for the 
downplaying of this political corruption factor is the lack of empirical evidence as to its effects. 
Recent United Nations and World Bank efforts to measure state socio-economic development 
indicators and governance factors, such as political corruption, now allow us to provide empirical 
evidence concerning the effects of political corruption on development. This paper will first review 
the literature on political corruption to see what others have found about its effects on state 
development. Through a series of statistical correlation and regression analyses, we will then test 
a number of hypotheses in an attempt to answer the question "What are the effects of political 
corruption on Caribbean development." This study finds that these effects are the most 
pronounced on a state's economic output and rule of law. 
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
The modern scholarly study of political corruption began in the 1960s and 1970s, spurred by the 
inclusion of corruption as an important factor in early modernization and democratization studies 
(Almond & Verba 1965, Huntington 1968). Since the 1960s, there have been hundreds of 
scholarly studies in the academic fields of anthropology, criminology, development studies, 
economics, financial management, international relations, public administration, political science, 
and sociology, all attempting to explain the causes and consequences of political corruption. 
These studies have adopted a variety of theoretical approaches. While the hundreds of mostly 
single-discipline corruption studies have produced rigorous theorizing and many useful case 
studies, the overall findings about the causes and consequences of corruption have been quite 
contradictory (Johnston 1986, p. 985). 
Most scholarly corruption studies consist of single case studies that provide few theoretical 
generalizations that transfer to the study of corruption in other states. Lancaster and Montinola 
(1997, p. 185) highlight that "problems of definition, operationalization, and measurement have 
thus far constrained most students of corruption to ideographic single case studies.. ..the lack of 
cross-national empirical studies prevents a more complete understanding of ... political 
corruption.'' Another scholar laments in her bibliography of political corruption that "high 
expectations about (corruption) theory [are] misplaced by a search for confirming data" (Johansen 
1990, p. 35). 
One of the main reasons for the dearth of quantitative empirical studies on political corruption was 
the lack of an accepted measure of the levels of political corruption in world states. This situation 
changed in the late-1990s when Transparency International, the Berlin-based non-governmental 
organization that addresses corruption issues, began to publish an annual "Corruption Perception 
Index" for a limited number of world states. Over the past 5 to 6 years, Transparency International 
and the World Bank have refined the techniques for measuring the perception of state corruption 
and have continually added new states to their indexes, such that now there are good comparative 
corruption perception measures for most world independent states (see Transparency lnternational 
2001; Kaufmann et al. 2002). Using the latest World Bank corruption and governance measures, 
combined with the latest World Bank and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
indicators of world development, it is now possible to provide empirical evidence of the effects of 
corruption on developing states. 
While this study is about the consequences of political corruption, we cannot ignore the causes of 
corruption, if for no other reason than to rule out factors such as political rights, civil liberties, social 
trust, and economic openness that are often presented as both causes and consequences of 
political corruption. Political corruption is an extremely complex social phenomenon that 
encompasses a number of political, economic, and social factors. While there is not space in this 
study to discuss the many complex causes of political corruption, Table_l summarizes the causes 
that have received both theoretical and empirical support in the author's previous works (see 
Collier 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002). Table I provides the structural factors that determine a ruling 
elite's opportunities for corruption and a rough index for measuring a state's level of corruption. 
m l e  1 factors such as a state's economic openness and its levels of political rights and civil 
liberties, often combined to measure a state's level of democracy, are not included in the empirical 
analysis in this study as it is has been found that these factors are causes and not consequences 
of political corruption. 
The literature on the consequences of political corruption falls into two general categories of 
indicators: (1) socio-economic output, and (2) economic investment sources. GDP per capita, 
which has been found to strongly correlate with a state's level of corruption, is one of the most- 
used socio-economic indicators to measure development. Lambsdotff (1999a) highlights, 
however, that there is little agreement in the literature as to the causal effects between GDP per 
capita and political corruption. The literature differs over whether a state's gross domestic 
economic output, as measured by GDP per capita, represents a cause or a consequence of 
corruption. One solution to this quandary can be found in the neoclassical economic theory 
concept of X-inefficiencies (Lambsdorff 2002). Drawing on the work of Leibenstein (1966), 
corruption theorists now point to the inefficiencies that corrupt government officials involved in 
policy-making and policy-execution create in a socio-economic system in order for the officials to 
benefit personally from their positions. The theory of X-inefficiencies offers that societies with high 
levels of corruption will experience significant self-imposed (X) inefficiencies in the use of societal 
resources resulting in macroeconomic mismanagement, lack of organizational innovation, loss of 
competitiveness, and overall collective non-performance. Systems with large X-inefficiencies are 
driven more by the "invisible foot" or "grabbing hand" of the governing elite and less by the 
"invisible hand" of market mechanisms as theorized by Adam Smith and others of the neoclassical 
economic school. Under the theory of X-inefficiencies, corruption creates distortions in a socio- 
economic system that benefits the governing elite and government bureaucrats, and those groups 
allied closely with them, at the expense of the mass citizenry. 
Under the theory of X-inefficiencies, GDP per capita, used as a measure of total societal economic 
output, becomes a logical indicator of development. This supports the proposition that states with 
high levels of economic X-inefficiencies created by a self-interested governing elite and 
government bureaucrats will display lower levels of economic growth as measured by GDP per 
capita. The X-inefficiencies also predict that capital available to the state would be used 
inefficiently, affecting not only the overall economic output, but also retarding the creation of 
infrastructure vital to sustained economic growth. This is especially true of governments that 
frequently support "white elephant" projects with public resources because they provide the 
governing elite more opportunities for obtaining economic rents (i.e., payoffs, kickbacks, bribes, 
speed money, etc.) than do more productive projects, such as building capital infrastructure and 
improving public welfare programs in education and health care. 
These areas related to X-inefficiencies have been the focus of past efforts to lend empirical 
support to the relationship between corruption and development. A World Bank team (Kaufmann 
et al. 1999) finds, drawing from earlier work by Hall and Jones (1999), that by controlling for 
countries in equal stages of development, measures of GDP are a fruitful path for determining 
effects of corruption on development. For example, Lambsdorff (1999b) discovers in regressing 
the ratio of GDP to capital stock on corruption in a cross-section of 69 countries, that a 6-point 
increase in the TI Corruption Perception Index-say an increase from Colombia's 1999 rating to 
that of the United Kingdom-would increase Colombia's GDP by 20 percent. Tanzi and Davoodi 
(1997) show that high levels of corruption lower the quality of state infrastructure, thus supporting 
the proposition that high levels of corruption decrease the efficiency of capital use in a society. 
Mauro (1997 & 1998) also determines that corruption lowers public expenditures on education and 
health care, arguing that the causal mechanism for this effect concerns the fact that "white 
elephant" projects not related to education or health programs (i.e., construction of roads, dams, 
airports, seaports, etc.) offer public servants better opportunities to collect rents. This same logic 
also governs the propensity of governments to invest in new technologies. States with high 
corruption levels are also less likely to expend resources on technology projects as they are less 
lucrative for rent-seeking than the more traditional "white elephant" projects (A.T. Kearney, Inc 
2002). 
The theory of X-inefficiencies is based on the assumption that the governing elite, government 
bureaucrats, and those allied with these groups, will benefit from the self-imposed inefficiencies 
they impart on the state's economic system and public expenditures. While these groups benefit 
from corruption, others in society suffer. Gupta et al. (1 998) offer that corruption increases societal 
income inequality as measured by the GIN1 Index. Controlling for a variety of variables in a cross- 
section of 37 countries, these authors find a strong positive impact of corruption on inequality. 
Other indicators of inequality and poverty, such as the UNDP's Human Poverty lndex and Gender 
Development lndex have not been used previously in models explaining the effects of corruption 
on development. 
The second category of development indicators, economic investment sources, is a much-studied 
area in the corruption literature. Neoclassical economic theory holds that high investment levels 
are critical to a state's economic growth. Mauro (1995) was one of the first to show that corruption 
negatively impacts investment levels as corruption increases investors' risk in various investment 
sources. Resources for a state's economy come from several investment sources, including 
foreign direct investment, portfolio investments, domestic savings, international aid, and state 
budgets. Foreign direct investment has been the topic of most corruption studies. Wheeler and 
Moody (1992), Mauro (1995, 1997, 1998), and Wei (1997) all show the strong correlation of 
corruption to foreign direct investment levels-i.e., where foreign firms acquire ownership or control 
over a state's firms. No studies have attempted to establish the empirical relationship between 
corruption and portfolio investments-i.e., where foreign entities invest in a state's stock and bond 
markets. Domestic savings have also not been a topic of empirical corruption studies, however, it 
is a topic of some theorizing. North and Weingast (1989) argue that domestic savings require trust 
in a state's banking system. Without such trust, domestic savings will either not be deposited in 
local banks, or will be transferred to foreign banks. Alesina and Weder (1999) discover, using a 
variety of empirical models that aid donor countries do not discriminate against states with high 
corruption levels. Conversely, several of their models found that corrupt states are more likely to 
attract aid from developed states. Finally, while no empirical studies exist to support the 
proposition, it can be argued that states with higher corruption levels will also have higher debt 
levels. This assumes that states with higher corruption levels will borrow more in order to provide 
additional sources for the governing elite's rent-seeking. Moreover, states with high debt levels will 
have fewer domestic resources to dedicate to infrastructure building or public welfare programs in 
education and health care. 
Another issue not discussed in the development literature is the consequences of corruption on 
societal levels of the rule of law. In the Caribbean, the wide-scale breakdown in the rule of law is 
largely related to the transnational trade in illegal drugs (see Griffith 1997, Bryan 2000). Every 
state in the Caribbean is affected by the illegal drug trade. Some states such as Jamaica, Trinidad 
and Tobago, St Vincent, and St. Lucia are drug producers growing local marijuana crops. The 
larger role of Caribbean states are as drug transshipment points for illegal cocaine and heroin 
shipments bound from South American drug producing countries to markets in the United States 
and Europe. The mixture of corruption and drugs creates a vicious cycle of crime and violence that 
is engulfing many of the small Caribbean states. Corruption is what allows the illegal drug trade to 
flourish. Drug money payoffs to government officials, police officers, and justice system officials 
cause these officials to "look the other way" as the drug gangs go about their business on many 
Caribbean states. For example, in Jamaica it has been found that the "Drug Dons" ally with 
"Political Dons" in many of the parliamentary constituencies. The Drug Dons provide resources to 
the Political Dons, resources that are then used by the Political Dons to support political patronage 
networks that eventually result in parliamentary votes. In return, the Drug Dons are allowed by the 
government to operate virtually unimpeded in many constituencies. Thus, in Jamaica, while the 
Members of Parliament can truthfully claim that they have never met a Drug Don, this does not 
mean that their political patronage networks have not been enriched by drug money funneled 
through the intermediary Political Dons (see Munroe 1999, chap. 4). Other Caribbean states have 
similar structures that allow drug-financed corruption to fuel the breakdown of the rule of law. 
Corruption alone is not the only variable that affects a state's level of development. The other key 
variables that must be consider concern resource endowments and geography-variables that 
speak to a state's potential comparative advantage. It can be assumed that those states with the 
best resource endowments are the most likely to develop faster. The most important resource 
endowments include: (1) energy resources, (2) non-petroleum natural resources, and (3) arable 
land. Geography is also a much-discussed variable that must be included in development models 
(Hausmann 2001). Tropical states, those located largely between the Tropic of Cancer (23.5 
degrees North latitude) and Tropic of Capricorn (23.5 degrees South latitude) are considered less 
likely to develop due to their poorer soil, erratic climates, and vulnerability to infectious diseases. 
States that are landlocked face other geographic constraints as their local companies experience 
increased transportation costs for the export and import of natural resources, agricultural products, 
and manufactured goods. Island states face similar constraints as they are reliant on costly air and 
sea transport and cannot take advantage of cross-border trade by land routes as can continental 
states. At first glance, Caribbean states are often penalized in all of these comparative advantage 
variables. Few have energy resources, non-petroleum natural resources, or large amounts of 
arable land per capita. At the same time, all Caribbean states (except Bermuda) are tropical, and 
all but four are island states when using this study's definition of the Caribbean that includes 
Belize, Bermuda, The Bahamas, the Greater and Lesser Antilles, Guyana, Suriname, and French 
Guiana. 
In order to test the full effects of political corruption on Caribbean development thus requires a 
number of individual hypothesis tests. A state's level of political corruption will be the primary 
independent variable of interest in each model. The models will have to control for both resource 
endowment and geographic factors. Therefore, the hypothesis tests must regress resource 
endowment, geography, and political corruption levels on a variety of dependent variable indicators 
related to a state's socio-economic output and economic investment sources. The following 
research design section develops these hypothesis tests in greater detail. 
Research Design 
This study tests two working hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Controlling for state resource endowment and geography, states with the lowest 
levels of corruption will display the highest levels of socio-economic output. 
Hypothesis 2 Controlling for state resource endowment and geography, states with he lowest 
levels of corruption will display the highest levels of economic investment resources. 
While this study is about Caribbean development, the samples used to test the above hypotheses 
are drawn from the total population of world small and medium size developing states. Small and 
medium size states are defined using Crowards (2002) Caribbean Development Bank study, which 
uses cluster analysis to place states in categories based on their population, land area, and total 
income. States are defined as developing if they fall into the UNDP's list of low- or middle-income 
states (see UNDP 2001, p. 258). This criterion defines a total population of 133 independent small 
or medium size developing states worldwide. To generalize to a population of 133 states at the 95 
percent confidence level requires a sample (N) of 99. To generalize to a population of 133 states 
at the 90 percent confidence level requires a sample (N) of 45. Due to states not having 
measurements for all variables in this study, samples used in this study's hypothesis tests range 
from 94 to 26 states. 
The above sampling discussion reveals that the generalizability of the hypothesis test results in 
this study are limited. All of this study's hypothesis tests, except one (technology achievement), 
fall within the range for 90 to 95 percent confidence levels. With better than 95 percent confidence 
used as a normal social science standard, this study's hypothesis tests can therefore only be 
generalized to the states that make up the samples for the individual tests. The larger Caribbean 
states are included in these samples. Conditions in these states, which are part of this study's 
sample, are generalizable from the hypothesis tests. However, we cannot generalize this study's 
results to any of the Caribbean's smaller states such as, Aruba, Bermuda, French overseas states, 
the United Kingdom territories, members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, or the 
Netherlands Antilles. The Bahamas is also not included in any of the samples due to its status as 
a high-income state. 
The measure of corruption, the main independent variable of interest in this study, is taken from 
the World Bank's working paper Governance Matters 11 (see Kaufmann et al. 2002). Corruption is 
measured on an index scale of -2.5 to +2.5, with +2.5 indicating the least (zero) corruption. 
Developed through analysis of a number of other corruption perception indexes, business risk 
surveys, and good governance indexes, this corruption index measures the perceptions of 
corruption in a state that public power is being exercised for private gain. Corruption indexes for 
1997-1998 were used to ensure that the corruption independent variable met time ordering criteria 
and lagged the 1999 measures of the development indicators used in this study as dependent 
variables. 
The resource endowment control variable was developed as an index ranging from 0 to 3 
indicating if a state is energy endowed, has substantial non-energy natural resources, or is 
endowed with substantial arable land. A state with a score of 3 on the index indicates it meets the 
requirements for all three of these resource factors. A state with a score of 0 on the index 
indicates it meets none of the resource requirements. A state with a score of 1 or 2 on the index 
indicates it meets 1 or 2 of the resource requirements. The individual resource factor requirements 
were established as follows using 1999 data9 
A state was coded as energy endowed if: the state was a major energy exporter (it 
exported more than 50% of its own commercial use), the state imported less than 50% of its 
commercial energy needs, or more than 50% of the state's total electricity consumption was 
generated by other than fossil fuels (hydro, nuclear, etc.). Sources: WB 2001, CIA 2001. 
A state had substantial non-energy natural resources if: the state was a major exporter of ores 
and metals (10% or more of its merchandise export totals); or the state possessed non-mineral, 
non-agricultural or non-petroleum natural resources that were a major export commodity. Sources: 
WB 2001, CIA 2001. 
A state was endowed with substantial arable land if it possessed more than .25 
hectares of arable land per capita. Sources: WB 2001, CIA 2001. 
The geography control variables were developed using a world map (see CIA 2001). Three 
dichotomous dummy variables, coded 1 and 0, were created to reflect the important geography 
factors. If 50 percent or more of a state is located between the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of 
Capricorn it was coded as having a Tropical Location. A state with no major seaports was coded 
as a Landlocked State. States completely surrounded by water were coded as Island States. 
A number of state socio-economic output factors are used as the dependent variables to test 
Hypothesis 1. These socio-economic factors include: 
P Per Cap@(US$)r Measured as a state's total gross domestic product divided by its 
total population. Sources: UNDP 2001, CIA 2001. GDP per capita should be considered 
as a proxy variable for a state's total economic output. By limiting this study's sample to 
small and medium size developing states, we comply .with the Kaufmann et al. (1999) 
findings that by controlling for countries in equal stages of development, measures of GDP 
are a fruitful path for determining effects of corruption on development. 
Formation Per Capita (US$I; Consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of 
the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories. Fixed assets include land 
improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and equipment 
purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, offices, 
hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. Inventories 
are stocks of goods held by firms to meet temporary or unexpected fluctuations in 
production or sales, and "work in progress." Source: WB 2001. 
Human Development Index; A composite index measuring average achievement in three 
basic dimensions of human development-a long and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent 
standard of living. lndex scale: .000 to 1. Source: UNDP 2001 .- 
E d u c a t i a n ; a m n  index based on the adult literacy rate and the combined primary, 
secondary, and tertiary gross students enrollment ratios. Rather than meabure the 
resources invested in education, this index measures the output of the education system. 
lndex scale: .OO to 1. Source: UNDP 2001 .- 
tancy Index; An index created by normalizing the measure of life expectancy at 
birth across states. This index can be used as a proxy variable for the output of a state's 
health system. lndex scale: .OO to 1. Source: UNDP 2001. 
Human Poverty Index; A composite index measuring human deprivation in the three basic 
dimensions captured in the human development index-longevity, knowledge, and standard 
of living. lndex scale 0 to 100, with 0 meaning no poverty. Source: UNDP 2001. 
GIN1 Index: A measure of the extent to which the distribution of income (or consumption) 
among individuals or households within a state deviate from a perfectly equal distribution. 
lndex scale 0 to 100, with 0 being perfect equality. Source: UNDP 2001. 
er Development Index A composite index measuring average achievement in the 
three basic dimensions captured in the human development index-a long and healthy life, 
knowledge, and a decent standard of living-adjusted to account for inequalities between 
men and women. lndex scale: .000 to 1. Source: UNDP 2001. 
vement Index: A composite index based on eight indicators in four 
dimensions: Technology creation, diffusion of recent innovations, diffusion of old innovations 
and human skills. lndex scale: .000 to 1. Source: UNDP 2001. 
Rule of I aw; A composite index that measures the extent to which people have confidence 
in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of both 
violent and non-violent crime. lndex scale: -2.5 to +2.5, with +2.5 being the strongest rule of 
law. Source: Kaufmann et al. 2002. 
A number of state economic investment source factors were used as the dependent 
variables to test Hypothesis 2. These economic investment source factors include: 
Foreian Direct lnvestment Per C a m  (US$): Net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting 
management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an 
economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of 
earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of 
payments. Source: WB 2001. 
olio Investment Per Ca~ i ta  (US$!: lnvestment excluding liabilities constituting foreign 
authorities' reserves covers transactions in equity securities and debt securities (i.e., stocks 
and bonds). Source: WB 2001. 
Domestic Savings Per Capita (US$): Calculated as GDP less final consumption 
expenditure (total consumption). Source: WB 2001. 
Aid Per Capita (I IS$); Official development assistance received through grants or loans, net 
of repayments. Source: UNDP 2001. 
Debt Service Per C a a  (US$); Debt service is the sum of principal repayments and 
interest actually paid in foreign currency, goods, or services on long-term debt, interest paid 
on short-term debt, and repayments (repurchases and charges) to the International 
Monetary Fund. Source: WB 2001. 
The analysis for this study was conducted using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS). Tables 2 through 4 summarize the analysis. .Table?& provides a descriptive summary of 
the sample used in the analysis. In Tables 3 and 4, the correlation and ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression analyses that are carried out in three phases are summarized. First, a bivariate 
correlation analysis was conducted using only the corruption independent variable with each of the 
dependent variables. This procedure reveals the strength of the bivariate relationships between 
corruption and each socio-economic output and economic investment source dependent variable 
defined above. B b l e  3, Column 1 provides the Pearson's correlation statistic for the bivariate 
correlation. Second, multivariate OLS regression tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2 were conducted by 
regressing the control variables for resource endowment and geography and the corruption 
independent variable on each dependent variable. Table 3, Column 2 provides the b coefficient for 
the corruption variable for these hypothesis tests, while Column 3 provides the Pearson's 
correlation ( R ~ )  for the same tests. Table4 provides the b coefficients for the control variables for 
resource endowments and geography from these same hypotheses tests. Finally, the hypothesis 
test models were re-run without the corruption independent variable as a sensitivity analysis to 
determine the amount of the Table 3, Column 3 Pearson's correlation ( R ~ )  for each test that could 
be attributed to the corruption variable. These results are shown in E&Ie 3, Column 4. Takzlcsa, 
Column 5 provides the number (N) in the sample for each hypothesis test. 
Bias in the above hypothesis tests that could affect the validity of this study's results originates 
from several sources. First, the researcher does not have control of the measurement of the 
corruption independent variable or any of the dependent variables defined above. Since these 
variables all come from World Bank, UNDP, or US Central Intelligence Agency sources, it is 
assumed they have come under some scrutiny-in fact these are considered the best 
measurement of each variable available. The corruption and rule of law variables are further 
suspect as they are based on the "perceptions" of businesspersons, government officials, analysts, 
and citizens who live or work in the developing states, however, these are also considered the best 
measurements of these variables currently available. All economic output variables are also 
suspect because they do not include figures for the informal economies that can account for 50 
percent of more of the economic transactions in some developing states. Second, the resource 
endowment variable described above is only a rough estimate of this concept for the sample 
states. A study that focused primarily on resource endowment as the main variable of interest 
would use a more refined measurement of this variable. Third, the concept of development is 
much more complex than the models developed in this study reveal. In this study, variables such 
as economic openness and levels of democracy, both of which exhibit strong correlations with 
socio-economic factors such as GDP per capita, are assumed to work through the intervening 
corruption variable (see Table I). More appropriately, economic openness and levels of 
democracy have causal links to both corruption and the socio-economic factors used as dependent 
variables in this study. To include these variables in this study's hypothesis tests would require the 
use of structural equation models whose analysis are beyond the scope of this study. If the above 
biases were accounted for in this study, combined they should have made the results of the 
regression tests more significant, thus strengthening the overall results showing the significant 
effects that corruption has on state development. 
Findings 
Eight of the ten hypothesis tests using socio-economic output factors as dependent variables 
support Hypothesis 1. Only the regression models for life expectancy index and GIN1 index were 
not significant. In Table, the economic factor tests for the variables GDP per capita and capital 
formation per capita were among the strongest of any of the dependent variables. Both of these 
economic variables showed moderate (greater than .40) bivariate correlation with the corruption 
variable. They also demonstrated highly significant results for the corruption variable in the 
Hypothesis 1 model, revealing that the corruption variable accounts for a significant amount of the 
variance explained by each model. The GDP per capita hypothesis test reveals that if a state were 
to improve its corruption index measure by 1 unit, its GDP per capita would increase by $3017. 
Moreover, if a state were to improve it corruption index measure by 1 unit, its capital formation per 
capita would increase by $642. These large dollar value increases for GDP per capita and capital 
formation per capita, combined with the fact corruption accounts for 23.8 percent and 22.6 percent 
of the variance in these two variables respective hypothesis tests, indicate just how significant 
corruption levels are to state economic development. These tests reveal how X-inefficiencies 
inserted into a state's economic system decrease the systems overall output. The capital 
formation variable is also an indicator of the serious effects that "white elephant" projects can have 
on a state's economy. 
When moving away from the economic output variables in Table 3, the tests of the composite 
socio-economic variables that measure human longevity, knowledge, and standard of living, 
support the hypothesis in 2 of 3 areas, however, the results are not as strong as for the above 
purely economic variables. The test of the human development index variable, which includes 
measures for income, education, and health, supports Hypothesis 1, however, the effects that a 1 
unit increase in the corruption index measure would have on the human development index (.086) 
are small. Additionally, Table shows that the overall influence of the corruption variable on the 
model variance (7.6 percent) is much weaker than for the above economic variables. Similar 
results are found for the educational index variable. Although the hypothesis test of the education 
index supports Hypothesis 1, its overall results are not strong. At best we can say that corruption 
has a weak effect on a state's educational system output. Finally, the test of the life expectancy 
index variable does not support Hypothesis 1. This study reveals that corruption has no significant 
effect on the output of a state's health system in this study's sample. 
The Table 3 tests of variables dealing with socio-economic inequality are also not as strong as the 
economic output variables. The test of the human poverty index, which includes measures for 
human longevity, knowledge, and standard of living, support Hypothesis 1, however, the effects 
that a I unit increase in the corruption index measure would have on the index (-7.62) is small and 
the overall influence that the corruption variable has on the model variance (6.5 percent) are 
weak. The same is generally true of the gender development index. The Hypothesis 1 test using 
the GIN1 Index as the dependent variable was not significant. This may be attributed to the small 
number of cases (N=59) included in this test, or the fact that income inequality has no relationship 
to corruption levels. 
The D b l e  3 test using the technology achievement index is quite interesting. Only 26 of the 
sample states were included in this test as the other states did not have a UNDP developed 
technology index score. Still, with such a small sample, the overall results were quite significant. 
Table 3 demonstrates that an improvement in the corruption index by 1 unit will cause the 
technology index to improve by .141. Additionally, 34.7 percent of the variance in the model for 
this hypothesis test can be attributed to the corruption variable. Thus, while we can only 
generalize to the sample of 26 states with a measure for the technology achievement index, it 
appears that for these 26 states corruption is a strong and highly significant factor in whether a 
state is able to adopt new technologies in hopes of increasing their economic output. 
The Table test using the rule of law variable is also interesting. Rule of law has the strongest 
and most significant relationship with corruption of any of the other variables included in the 
Hypothesis 1 socio-economic output tests. The bivariate analysis reveals a strong ,714 correlation 
between the two variables. Table 3 reveals that a 1 unit increase in the corruption variable will 
cause an .841 increase in the rule of law-an extremely strong effect considering the two variables 
are measured on the same scale. When rule of law is used in the Hypothesis I model as the 
dependent variable, corruption explains 51.9 percent of the variance in the rule of law-also an 
extremely strong effect for any social science model. Thus, Table 3 reveals that corruption has a 
strong and highly significant effect on a state's rule of law. 
The second set of m l e  2 variables analyzed are those used in testing Hypothesis 2, which is 
concerned with the effects of corruption on economic investment sources. Here only two of the 
five tests supported Hypothesis 2-foreign direct investment per capita and domestic savings per 
capita. The tests indicate that an improvement in the corruption variable by 1 unit will increase 
foreign direct investment per capita by $1 10 and increase domestic savings per capita by $293. 
While these relationships are significant, they tend to be weak as corruption only accounts for 7.3 
percent of the variance in the Hypothesis 2 model using foreign direct investment as the 
dependent variable, while corruption accounts for only 7.0 percent of the variance when domestic 
savings per capita is used as the dependent variable. The portfolio investment per capita variable 
was not significant, possibly due to there being a small number (N=56) of states in its test. As a 
result of these hypothesis tests it can be stated that corruption does have an affect on the amounts 
of foreign direct investment and domestic savings that a state will have made available for its 
economic growth. 
The aid per capita variable did not pass the Hypothesis 2 tests. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that, up to 1999, a state's level of corruption had no effect on the decisions of developed states 
and international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank, etc.) toward dispensing development 
funding. This supports Alesina and Weder's (1999) findings that aid donor countries do not 
discriminate against states with high corruption levels. When plotting aid per capita and corruption 
on a bivariate scatterplot, an interesting relationship was revealed. For states with corruption index 
measures between -2.5 and + I  .O, there was no discernible pattern in the scatterplot. However, for 
states with corruption index measures above +1.0, there was a strong linear correlation that 
showed as corruption levels improved, aid greatly increased. So while it appears that donors are 
not discriminating against corrupt states, it also appears that they also provide increased aid 
amounts to those states who reach a certain level of freedom from corruption. 
Finally, while the Table 3 debt service per capita showed significant results in the Hypothesis 2 
testing, the pattern in the variables was the opposite of that hypothesized. Table reveals that as 
a state's corruption conditions improved, its total debt service per capita also increased. This 
demonstrates that the states that are most corrupt are not the ones who are borrowing the most, 
instead the sample states without significant corruption problems have the largest debt burdens. 
Thus, in contrast to the assumption that corrupt governing elites will borrow more in order to 
increase their opportunities for rent-seeking, it appears that states with lesser corruption levels are 
borrowing more, possibly to stimulate their economic output. 
A short analysis is also required of the 7abla.4. regression results for the resource endowment and 
geography control variables. The resource endowment index was significant in 8 of this study's 15 
hypothesis tests. It was most significant in terms of its effects on the economic factors of GDP per 
capita and capital formation and the economic investment factors of foreign direct investment and 
domestic savings per capita. Tropical location was a significant factor in 12 of this study's 15 
hypothesis tests. This study thus reveals the power of this factor in explaining state development, 
in particular the debilitating effect that geography can have on a state's progress toward 
development. The variables for landlocked and island states were each significant in less than half 
of this study's hypothesis tests. This reveals that these variables need additional scrutiny before 
inclusion in development models. However, this study demonstrates that a state's resource 
endowment and its tropical location are factors that must be considered in any development 
model. 
Findings Relative to the Caribbean 
Since nine Caribbean States were in the sample for this study, the results of this study can be 
generalized to those nine states which include: Belize, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti, 
Jamaica, Puerto Rico, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. Table 7 reveals that these Caribbean 
states are statistically better than comparable small and medium-size developing states in other 
regions in terms of average corruption levels and GDP per capita. This is despite the B W  
demonstration that the Caribbean states have the lowest levels of resource endowment of any 
region. Table summarizes the levels of political corruption measured among Caribbean states. 
The Bahamas is included in Table 5 for comparison even though it was not in the sample as it is 
considered a developed high-income state. Additionally, the right column in m l e  5 reveals the 
relative corruption ranking of other Caribbean states based on the author's previous work (see 
Collier 2000). Overall, Table 5 and this study demonstrate that the Caribbean has a real political 
corruption problem that is significantly retarding the region's development. 
Like other small and medium developing states, this study reveals that the most significant effects 
of corruption on Caribbean development are in total economic output (GDP per capita), capital 
formation, and in the rule of law. The X-inefficiencies that Caribbean governing elite are inserting 
into the Caribbean economies are a major cause of the region's degraded economic outputs and 
low levels of capital formation. The desires of Caribbean governing elite to share in the spoils of 
the illegal international drug trade are decreasing the rule of law as evidenced by the skyrocketing 
crime and violence rates across the region. In slightly weaker, but still significant ways, the levels 
of Caribbean corruption also affect the educational output, inequalities, and economic investment 
sources of these small and medium size states. 
It is easier to see the effects of political corruption on Caribbean states when the Table 3 results 
are used to predict how improvements in political corruption can affect conditions in individual 
Caribbean states. Table shows the predictions for conditions in Haiti and Jamaica if there were a 
1 unit improvement in political corruption in each of those states. A 1 unit improvement in the 
corruption levels in Haiti would only bring it up to the approximate corruption levels now found in 
Suriname. While a 1 unit improvement in political corruption in Haiti would improve its annual 
socio-economic conditions across the board, the most significant effects would be a 206.1 percent 
increase in GNP, a $5.0 billion increase in capital formation, $860.2 million increase in foreign 
direct investment, and a $2.3 billion increase in domestic savings. A 1 unit improvement in political 
corruption in Jamaica world bring it up to a corruption level slightly better than The Bahamas. 
Table 6 demonstrates that with this corruption improvement would come an 84.7 percent increase 
in GNP, a $1.7 billion increase in capital formation, a $286.4 million increase in foreign direct 
investment, and a $761.6 million increase in domestic savings. Economic improvements of these 
magnitudes, even if over a 5-10 year period, would be considered economic miracles in most 
Caribbean states. As this study demonstrates, to achieve these economic improvements only 
requires a 1 unit improvement in a state's level of corruption. 
Conclusion 
In attempting to explain the effects of political corruption on Caribbean states, this study has in fact 
done so for most world small and medium size developing states. High levels of political corruption 
have a major economic effect on these developing states as it decreases overall economic output 
(GDP per capita) and reduces capital formation. It also has a major effect on a state's rule of 
law-the more the corruption the weaker the rule of law. High levels of political corruption are also 
shown to have an effect on a state's educational output, societal inequalities, and on the levels of 
economic investment sources available, particularly foreign direct investment and domestic 
savings. International aid was not shown to be related to a state's level of corruption. This may 
soon change, however, as the recent Monterey Consensus has pledged more aid to developing 
states provided they open their economies to trade, reduce human rights violations, and reduce 
political corruption. These new rules should soon affect who receives aid from the World Bank, 
IMF, and Western banks that work closely with the World Bank, IMF and other international 
financial institutions. This study's main conclusion is that political corruption does have a major 
effect on the development of the small and medium size states in our study. If these states, 
including those in the Caribbean, ever hope to develop they must address their corruption 
problems. How do they address the complex causes of corruption? Table.l provides a starting 
point for states to assess their corruption problems and begin needed corrections. 
In a small way, this study has also tested one aspect of dependency theory. Cardoso and Faletto 
(1979) highlight that the dependency structure does not always start with the external components 
of the world capitalist system. Dependency can also start internal to developing states with the 
local bourgeoisie who control state economic systems, as occurs throughout the Caribbean. 
[Capital] [a]ccumulation is the result of the appropriation of natural resources by local 
entrepreneurs and the exploitation of the labor force by this same local group. The starting 
point for capital accumulation is thus internal (Cardoso & Faletto 1979, p. xix). 
These internal groups are then linked through international markets and financial institutions to the 
world capitalist system, thus creating the system of dependency. This study demonstrates that this 
local bourgeoisie consists of government officials, government bureaucrats, and those economic, 
political, and social groups allied with them. It is this group whose acts of political corruption place 
the X-infficiencies in state economic systems and thus create the degradations to state 
development addressed in this study. Protestors of world no-liberal economic reforms would do 
well to address this internal link to the world capitalist system, instead of focusing their protests 
solely on the more visible external components of the system (developed states, World Bank, IMF, 
WTO, multinational corporations, etc.). 
Finally, this is far from the final study of the effects of political corruption on Caribbean 
development. Future studies should strive to include more unbiased measures for state political 
corruption levels. Measures for corruption levels in the micro-states in the Caribbean (e.g., the far 
right column of B b l e  are vitally needed. Measures of other independent and dependent 
variables also need refining, particular the inclusion of informal economic measures in state 
economic output factors. A better picture of the effects of corruption would also be obtained by 
using a structural equation model analysis that allows important variables such as economic 
openness, levels of democracy, and GNP per capita to be included in the overall models used to 
test for the consequences of political corruption on state development. In the mean time, until 
more Caribbean states have corruption measures and other variables are measured with less bias, 
this study provides empirical evidence that political corruption does have a serious effect on the 
overall development of small and medium size developing states. 
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